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Abstract  
 
This paper examines Adam Smith’s concept of an Invisible Hand of the market in 
light of the underlying assumptions for the theory to hold. Furthermore, the study 
focuses on Total Factor Productivity as a measure of efficiency of resource 
allocation, and employs growth accounting in Bulgaria relative to a frontier 
country (Germany), and tries to explain the Total Factor Productivity gap with 
the difference in the quality of institutions and economic freedom performance 
(where the latter is based on the Freedom Index Indicators). Satisfactory results 
have been obtained, favouring the hypothesis that freer markets perform better 
and a “catching up” effect of Bulgaria’s Total Factor Productivity levels towards 
those of Germany has been observed. Finally, the study provides policy 
recommendations facilitating the Invisible Hand Process in Bulgaria for a more 
rapid convergence towards Germany’s productivity levels. 
 
Keywords: Invisible Hand of the Market, Free Market Economy, Total Factor 
Productivity, convergence 
 
 
Introduction  
 
“An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” is Adam 
Smith’s most influential work that has had an impact on the world of economics 
since its publishing in 1776. It became “the gospel of free trade and economic 
liberalism” (Copley and Sutherland, 1995). One of the most essential propositions 
in modern economics were made in this classic book – competitive markets are 
able to allocate scarce resources efficiently when governments do not play a 
dominant role. Smith defined the term “wealth” of a society by the annual 
production of its labour and not by the amount of gold that a society owns. A good 
way of expanding this wealth, he suggested, is by the division of labour - when 
                                                     
*Nadezhda GESHEVA is associate data modeller at Experian, Bulgaria; e-mail: 
nadeto.gesheva@gmail.com. 
** Aleksandar VASILEV is assistant professor at the American University, Bulgaria; e-
mail: alvasilev@yahoo.com. 
46  |  Nadezhda GESHEVA and Aleksandar VASILEV 
 
Eastern Journal of European Studies | Volume 8(1) 2017 | ISSN: 2068-6633 | CC BY | www.ejes.uaic.ro 
people specialize in the field that they are most productive in, and trade these 
produced goods and services for the one they need, thus economic growth is 
achieved. According to Smith, a certain “natural liberty” is encoded in human 
nature – a condition in which individuals tend to pursue their own goals. 
Nevertheless, the pursuit of an individual’s own interest results in the increase in 
common wealth, although this is achieved unintentionally. Smith used the 
metaphor of an Invisible Hand to illustrate the natural instincts that motivate and 
model the behaviour of the participants in a market so that a greater variety of 
goods and services are being offered and received (Walton and Wykoff, 1998). 
The process is called invisible simply because it is not intentional. Adam Smith 
argues that the “system of liberty” – interaction between these self-serving 
individuals not hampered by any excessive regulations – would lead to an 
optimization point (i.e., Pareto optimization).  
A burning issue is whether the Invisible Hand of the market is still relevant? 
In theory, three types of economic systems exist – free market economy, command 
economy and mixed market economy. The former is characterized by the limited 
role of the government, while in the latter the government is in full control of all 
political, economic and social matters. In practice, the third option - mixed market 
economy - is the most widespread in the 21st century. Almost every economy is 
a blend of the free market and the command economy types. Today, almost 250 
years after Adam Smith’s revolutionary idea was first shaped, the modern citizen 
of the global village enjoys a profoundly different economic situation. Thus, there 
is a need to transform Adam Smith’s theory into modern day language. One could 
interchange “is the Invisible Hand still relevant” with “are societies that rely on 
economic freedom, healthier and more productive”. Nowadays, the burning issue 
is what proportion of mix from free market and command economy will produce 
the most successful and productive economy? Taking into consideration the above 
discussed theory of Adam Smith, the consequently provided arguments and the 
conducted analysis of the main drivers of economic prosperity, this study 
advocates in favour of the relevance of the Invisible Hand of the market.  
  
1. Literature review 
 
Although the mechanism of the Invisible Hand of the Market (IHM), 
derived as an economic theory in the middle of the 18th century, has no direct 
reference to the field of Mathematics, it is important to acknowledge that both 
have common ground. Similarly to a mathematical statement, the IHM theory 
consists of two parts: the hypothesis or assumptions made, and the conclusion 
drawn. One should emphasize the fact that the Invisible Hand of the Market is 
working if and only if specific conditions are fulfilled, and fails when they are not 
present. The validity of Smith’s theory is highly dependent on a set of factors 
ranging from the economic, political and social spheres. To begin with, the 
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essence of the Invisible Hand hypothesis lies in the low degree of government 
intervention in the economy (i.e. laissez-faire policy), including no price controls 
and stable inflation leading to prices serving as an efficient market clearing 
mechanism. In addition to this, a society needs to be free of informational 
asymmetries and confusion in order for the market to clear at the existing prices 
and to achieve dynamical equilibrium levels. 
 What is more, the market place must have low barriers to entry and exit, 
reasonable transaction costs as well as numerous market participants of equal size. 
These assumptions comprise the major requirements for a free market system to 
operate properly, implying that they are not specific hard-to-attain requirements 
for the validity of the IHM but a necessity for every free market economy. The 
political and social conditions represent a vital background for implementing the 
Invisible Hand Mechanism: the efficiency with which the Rule of Law is enforced, 
the low crime rate and the protection of human rights are necessary prerequisites 
for the validity of the theory.  
On balance, the above mentioned assumptions serve as a hypothesis for the 
Invisible Hand statement. If all the conditions are present, then Smith’s Invisible 
Hand allocates limited resources (scarce goods and labour force) in the most 
efficient way (i.e. in a Pareto efficient way), thus promoting economic prosperity 
(Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Describes the necessary conditions for the IHM to work. 
 
 Assumptions/Hypothesis  Conclusion 
If 
Laissez-faire economy 
No informational asymmetries or confusion 
Low entry and exit in the market 
Uniformity of market participants 
Low transaction costs 
Rule of Law 
Protection of Human Rights 
are present,  
then 
the Invisible Hand 
of the Market 
allocates limited 
resources 
efficiently. Thus, 
promoting 
economic 
prosperity. 
 
Source: own representation 
 
The structure of the study is along the following lines. After transforming 
Smith’s theory into modern day language and clarifying that the Invisible Hand 
works only if a set of assumptions are present, part 2 examines instances of market 
failure. Those market failures imply the non-existence of the IH when one of the 
assumptions is not met – the lack of adequate information. The discussion relies 
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on the economic findings of George Akerlof and Joseph Stiglitz. The section also 
covers Schumpeter’s Creative Destruction process acknowledged by this paper as 
a process that has much in common with the IHM. Part 3 illustrates a quantitative 
method (Growth Accounting) used for measuring the influence of IH on economic 
prosperity by introducing the concept of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and 
associating it with Freedom Index Indicators. A thorough analysis of the drivers 
of economic success in Bulgaria and Germany is presented further backed by an 
empirical data analysis using dynamic correlation estimations in section 4. The 
following section provides evidence in favour of Bulgaria’s TFP convergence 
towards Germany’s TFP levels. In addition, the last section highlights the major 
impediments standing between Bulgaria and the frontier country, and proposes 
suggestions for improvements in the lagging components.  
Appendix A further clarifies the Growth Accounting Methods used in 
Section 3 and provides detailed quantitative methods for generating the TFP series 
for Bulgaria and Germany, while Appendix B further illustrates the analysis 
conducted with the use of thorough correlation tables and convergence graphs. 
Section 6 provides some policy recommendations. 
Although many economists have studied the extent to which Smith’s theory 
is viable, the analysis provided in this paper does not seem to have been formally 
derived in the previous literature. Both - the Invisible Hand’s quantitative measure 
and the concentrated study of Bulgaria’s convergence towards Germany in terms 
of Freedom Indexes as a manifestation of the Invisible Hand’s process - are an 
intriguing supplement to the current economic literature.    
 
2. Instances of market failure – factors that hinder the invisible hand of the 
market 
 
Information economics is a broad microeconomic theory that examines 
how information systems affect economic decisions, and thus hinder the work of 
the Invisible Hand of the market. Extensive research on this issue was originally 
motivated in 1945 by Friedrich Hayek with the publication of his “The Use of 
Knowledge in Society” but the following section focuses on the information 
disorder research carried out by the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences 
winners in 2001– George Akerlof and Joseph Stiglitz. This study discusses 
instances, suggested by the above mentioned economists, where the price 
mechanism fails to coordinate efficiently economic activity and the division of 
labour. Possible ways of resolving information asymmetries are also examined.  
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2.1. George Akerlof – increase in transaction costs due to informational 
asymmetries  
 
Information asymmetries inevitably arise in a market economy, causing 
adverse selection. The famous economist George Akerlof sheds some light on this 
issue with his work “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism”. The paper asserts that there are significant economic costs 
to dishonesty between a buyer and a seller, and this thesis is best explained with 
the market for second hand cars. According to Akerlof, there are two types of used 
cars – good ones and bad ones (also known as lemons). On the one hand, in a 
second hand market, prospective buyers purchase a car with lack of information 
about the quality of the product. On the other hand, the owner, after managing a 
certain car, has observed whether the machine has malfunctioned in some areas or 
has shown outstanding results. His own estimate is far more accurate than the 
judgment of the potential buyer. Hence, asymmetrical information has arisen; 
consequently, price does not serve as a signal for the market clearing level any 
more. The existence of informational disorder violates one of the main 
assumptions of the Invisible Hand process; hence, prices no longer measure 
desirability and scarcity, and are unable to allocate resources efficiently. What is 
more, good cars and lemons must sell at the same price, since the buyer is unable 
to differentiate between the products. In order to inform themselves better, buyers 
of a certain product either use market statistics to judge the quality of the desired 
good, or use the specialized assistance of a car mechanic. Both of these options 
give rise to transaction costs.  
To conclude, dishonesty between market participants creates information 
asymmetries with a negative economic impact. The cost of dishonesty consists not 
only in the amount by which the purchaser is cheated but also in the “thinning of 
the market”, nearly driving it out of existence. In a market with information 
asymmetries, the self-interest of market participants does not meet society’s best 
needs, contrary to Smith’s argument. 
 
2.2. Joseph Stiglitz – inefficient allocation of the labour market  
 
In the prize lecture “Information and the Change in the Paradigm in 
Economics” in 2001, Stiglitz opposes the Classical Economics View and that of 
Adam Smith – that if free markets were left on their own, unemployment could 
be eliminated and an optimal division of labour could be achieved, since markets 
would be much more price flexible. Stiglitz asserts that significant wage and price 
flexibility, in times of recessions, would actually drive the economy into a bigger 
recession due to even higher drops in prices and wages. Furthermore, he rejects 
the hypothesis that unemployment is a direct consequence of interference either 
by government in setting minimum wage laws, or by trade unions, using their 
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monopoly power to set too high wages. Stiglitz regards the Invisible Hand of the 
Market as a nonexistent phenomenon and argues that government guidance is the 
key to a healthy economy.  
Joseph Stiglitz also discusses the issues deriving from the fact that distinct 
people have access to diverse information. Information has an impact on decision 
making in both firms and households. According to the American economist, 
symptoms of a market failure due to information asymmetries are events such as 
recessions and depressions, accompanied by massive unemployment. Joseph 
Stiglitz supports his thesis on the inefficient allocation of the labour force by 
giving an example for market participants who might intentionally create 
informational disorder in order to profit. For instance, managers (as a matter of 
precaution) would like to increase their bargaining power over a certain employee. 
Stiglitz regards that even an insignificant amount of information imperfection 
affects equilibrium levels and keeps the Invisible Hand from optimizing the 
market. Nevertheless, the economist suggests a way to combat asymmetry in 
information. Namely, the incentive of the worker to establish his own ability and 
skills diminishes informational asymmetries in the labour market. Assume several 
workers, he argues, are grouped under the assumption of similar skills and wages. 
Hence, the most able would have an incentive to reveal his/her full potential and 
to receive more, while the rest of the group will be left with the mean marginal 
product of the group. Then, the most able among the new group would also gain 
incentive to reveal his ability. By continuing this process, there will be a stage of 
full revelation and the least able will be the last person. The driving force behind 
this mechanism is competition among employees and the desire to perform better 
than one’s rivals. 
To conclude, the prize lecture “Information and the Change in the Paradigm 
in Economics” presents an indication of the asymmetries that diverse information 
causes in the market place, in particular the labour force allocation. However, 
there are means to counteract information asymmetries, and reach optimization 
point through competition and pursuit of one’s own interest, which implies the 
existence of an invisible market mechanism if certain factors are present.  
 
2.3. Creative destruction vs the Invisible Hand – complements or substitutes?  
 
According to the classical and neoclassical theory, free markets are able to 
allocate scarce resources efficiently, meaning that no transaction costs must be 
associated with the process. Yet, Akerlof (1970), Stiglitz (2001) and Spence 
(1973) provide sufficient ground to question the validity of this statement. 
Furthermore, even Smith (1759) emphasizes the fact that the division of labour 
and the expansion of markets necessitate costs, also known as transactions costs. 
The British economist Ronald Coase (1937) was the first to state that the 
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emergence of the firm, as an economic organization, would not have happened, 
unless there were transaction costs in free markets. 
The reason for certain transactions to be made by firms, and not by the 
market participants is that they avoid costs related to information, negotiations 
and monitoring (Sedlarski, 2009). Transaction costs are a useful tool to explain 
the existence of institutions, markets failures, etc. Furthermore, the primary 
function of institutions and firms is to decrease the level of uncertainty that market 
participants have against one another by diminishing the complexity of 
interpersonal interactions. Taking into account game theory, institutions 
contribute to the rise of cooperation and the well-being of all participants.  
It is essential to discuss the interactions of firms in the market place since 
they are a driver of economic dynamism. In 1942, the Austrian economist Joseph 
Schumpeter devoted a chapter from his paper “Capitalism, Socialism, and 
Democracy” discussing the “Creative Destruction”. There he illustrates economic 
evolution as a process for a certain society (Cox, 2015). Schumpeter calls 
“Creative Destruction” the continuous organizational development of institutions, 
the rise of competition among market members, and the entry of new and exit of 
old firms in the market. He envisions the industrial change that takes place as 
ongoing process of revolutionizing the economic structure by destroying the old 
and creating a new one. The Austrian emphasizes that this is an essential feature 
of capitalism, or free market economy. 
To start with, capitalism encourages the implementation of new ideas, the 
production of new products and the offering of new services. This dynamic 
environment creates competition and entrepreneurship – the main driver in the 
Creative Destruction process. Each firm has an incentive to introduce new 
products and services, and to use the latest technology to gain bigger market share 
and to maximize their profits. New entrants compete with established firms, by 
offering lower prices, new features, faster service, better locations and aggressive 
marketing strategies. Such a market behaviour is similar to the one that Adam 
Smith has described where the pursuit of self-interest leads to progress. 
Schumpeter further argues that the survival of a company is dependent on 
the innovation and new technologies it uses in its production. If a firm fails to 
offer competitive prices and innovative products, (hence losing customers), the 
firm defaults and resources are transferred from lagging sectors to allocations 
where their usage will bring highest returns. By doing this, the creative destruction 
process (or the Invisible Hand of the market) makes scarce resources meet their 
best use; consequently, societies as a whole become wealthier.  
An intriguing feature of this process is that benefits are not immediate while 
costs are. Western nations, such as Germany, have adopted capitalism and gave 
freedom to the creative destruction, thus achieving significant economic success. 
However, the constant change of lagging firms with new, better-equipped ones 
creates unemployment and noise in the system. Therefore, there will always be 
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the uncertainty factor that drives emerging markets such as Bulgaria to choose the 
status quo instead of change. This results in resistance towards economic change; 
it binds up the Invisible Hand of the market and impedes creative destruction. 
 
3. A possible approach to measure the effect of the invisible hand: a 
comparative analysis between Bulgaria and Germany 
 
For the analysis that follows, this paper presumes that the assumptions 
made in the IHM theory, thoroughly described in Table 1 above, are 
predominantly present.  
This section of the paper examines what the underlying reasons behind the 
differences in prosperity between the leader of the European Union, Germany, and 
a transition country like Bulgaria, also a member of the European Union since 
2007, are. While Germany is a founding member, Bulgaria has joined the EU ten 
years ago but cooperation between Germany and Bulgaria started one hundred 
years ago. During World War I and World War II, they were allies and were 
politically and economically dependent on one another. The commercial relations 
were mainly Bulgarian exports to Germany. Although the initial relations between 
the two nations had a military basis, as time passed, their relations shifted to the 
economic and scientific sphere. Today, around 5 000 German companies operate 
in Bulgaria, and a similar number of Bulgarian students attend German 
universities in addition to the tens of thousands of Bulgarian citizens who live and 
work in Germany1. Furthermore, various conferences such as the “Bulgarian-
German Scientific Cooperation – Past, Present and Future” outline the benefits of 
collaboration between scientists from both countries in diverse areas of science 
(Humboldt Union in Bulgaria, 2015). In 2013, Germany became Bulgaria’s main 
trading partner and the largest buyer of goods produced in Bulgaria worldwide 
(Federal Foreign Office, 2015). Thus, Bulgaria follows closely the steps of the 
leader of the European Union towards its way to prosperity. 
But how does one measure economic prosperity? Gross domestic product 
is a good starting point and yet, sometimes, countries owe their high GDP to the 
increase in the inputs of the production function, namely the number of people 
employed and the level of capital in the economy. Interestingly, there are instances 
where a country has experienced an economic boom while the levels of labour and 
capital have been decreasing (Ganev, 2005). This fact raises the question of 
whether there is another factor, namely an essential feature of capitalism that 
drives the economy into expansion. Robert Solow gave an answer to this issue in 
1957 when he published a paper called “Technical Change and the Aggregate 
Production Function”. There, he argues that the growth of the gross domestic 
product is directly dependent not only on the relative change in capital and labour, 
                                                     
1 Acording to the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015. 
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but on the relative change in a third factor as well (equation 1). Technological 
progress is the missing variable in the equation of economic growth. Apart from 
the impacts that labour and capital have on real GDP, there is an emphasis on the 
substantial contribution that Total Factor Productivity (TFP) has. It might also be 
considered as the Solow residual – the contribution of the human capital and 
machinery efficiency combined with the introduction of new technologies and 
policies. In this study, total factor productivity, technological progress and Solow 
residual are used interchangeably. Equation (1) illustrates the Cobb-Douglass 
aggregate production function: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡 . 𝐹(𝐾𝑡 , 𝐿𝑡),     (1) 
or equivalently, 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡 . 𝐾𝑡
𝛼 . 𝐿𝑡
1−𝛼,    (2). 
The growth equation comprises labour input, capital input and 
technology/productivity level. Lt is measured by the total number of hours worked 
in the current year; Kt – the real value of machinery, equipment and buildings in 
the current year; and At – as a residual of the technological advancements and level 
of development for the current year. Furthermore, alpha and beta are the output 
elasticities of capital and labour, respectively. Assuming perfect competition, 
alpha and beta should sum up to 1. 
This paper relies on Growth Accounting Approach2 as a method to compute 
the rate of technological progress measured as a residual from equation 1. Data 
on Yt and Lt is available, while data on Kt could be easily generated with the 
capital formation series. Then, At could be calculated as a residual value from the 
equation in growth rates: 
𝐿𝑛𝑌𝑡 = 𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑡 + 𝛼. 𝐿𝑛𝐾𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼). 𝐿𝑛𝐿𝑡,  (3) 
For further details on the computation of the residual, please refer to 
Appendix A. 
 
3.1. Drivers of economic prosperity – The Freedom Index Indicators  
 
The main debunkers of the IHM, such as George Akerlof and Joseph 
Stiglitz, do not take into account at all the “self-correcting” tendencies of the 
                                                     
2 Instead of employing the Growth Accounting Method, some economic scholars use the 
econometric approach to assess the significance of the given factors as a driver of total 
factor productivity. In the current comparative study of Bulgaria and Germany, the 
econometrics approach is not preferred due to the limitation of the available time series 
data for Bulgaria and Germany (annual data for the time span 1995-2013) that would 
generate inconsistent results.  
What is more, forecasts on what will be the trend in the TFP gap two years from now could 
also be conducted with the use of econometric models. Analysis with current data shows 
that TFP gap is an AR (1), meaning an autoregressive process of order one with high 
persistence. These provide a basis for future research. 
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economy in a longer period of time. In particular, Stiglitz (2001) overstates the 
need of government intervention in the economy. The government should help 
improve an economic downturn not by a direct intervention that would create 
insecurity in the system, but indirectly by adopting policies that encourage 
research and development, saving and investing, free trade and secure property 
rights. Most importantly, it must provide a legal and political framework that 
supports private sector activities and enables them to attain optimal level of 
production. This legal and political framework is called the Economic Freedom 
Index. Economic freedom is a term used to measure the ability of every human to 
regulate his or her own labour and property. In an economic free society, 
government refrains from active interaction in the market sector and its main role 
is to provide liberty and protection of the individual. In such societies, citizens are 
free to consume, produce, invest and save as they will.  
Economic freedom is formed on ten qualitative and quantitative elements, 
divided into four extensive types: Rule of Law, Limited Government, Regulatory 
Efficiency, and Open Markets. 
The first one includes two indexes – Property Rights and Freedom from 
Corruption. To begin with, Property Rights index is a valuation of the ability of 
citizens of a country to own private property that is secured by laws; furthermore, 
the index assesses their ability to enforce contracts. Additionally, it is a 
measurement of the strictness with which these laws are enforced by the 
government as well as it is a proxy for the independence of the judiciary and the 
existence of corruption within it. A higher score on this index is interpreted as a 
good legal protection of the property, while a lower score means corruption and 
possible expropriation. On the one hand, data on Bulgaria suggests that during 
1995-2013, the country’s property rights actually deteriorated from 50 (out of 100) 
basis points in the first half of the period to 30 in the second half of the time span. 
On the other hand, Germany’s score remains constant at 90 throughout the 
observed period, suggesting an efficient court system and secured private property 
(Figure 1). 
The second component in Rule of Law is Freedom from Corruption. The 
data for it is obtained from Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index. Again, a high score on this component means very little corruption, while 
a low score indicates a corrupt government and an erosion of economic freedom. 
Data analysis shows an average of 35.5 for Bulgaria and an average of 80.3 for 
Germany for the specified time period (Figure 2). 
What is more, Limited Government is based on indexes such as Fiscal 
Freedom and Government Spending. The first factor is an indicator of the tax 
burden set by the government. It is an average measure of three types of tax in a 
certain country – top marginal rate on corporate income, top marginal tax rate on 
individual income and total tax burden as a percentage of the gross domestic 
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product. When the three factors are averaged together, they make up to 100 basis 
points. 
 
Figure 1. Property Rights Index for Bulgaria and Germany (1995-2013) 
 
Source: Heritage Foundation 
 
Figure 2. Freedom from Corruption Index for Bulgaria and Germany (1995-
2013) 
 
Source: Heritage Foundation 
 
It is essential to emphasize that, with the introduction of the flat tax rate in 
Bulgaria in 2008, the average economic growth rate became higher (Vasilev, 
2015b), whereas the size of the grey economy in Bulgaria diminished (Vasilev, 
2015c). These effects can be observed in Figure 3 as Bulgaria has made a 
tremendous jump from a score of 46 in 1995 to 94 in 2013; however, the low level 
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of taxes comes at the expense of adequate public services. Germany has also 
improved but not as much – from 33.2 in 1995 to 61.8 in 2013  
 
 
Figure 3. Fiscal Freedom for Bulgaria and Germany (1995-2013) 
 
Source: Heritage Foundation 
 
Government Spending is the second element in the Limited Government 
category. State expenditure (including consumption and transfers) as a percentage 
of GDP is accounted for there. According to the index, there is no ideal score on 
this criterion, since it varies across countries. Nonetheless, research (Riedl, 2008; 
Stratmann and Okolski, 2010) has shown that economic dynamism is negatively 
affected by high government expenditure that causes budget deficit and results as 
a sovereign debt. Therefore, a high score on the Government Spending component 
indicates a moderate or even low amount of government interference in the 
economy. Bulgaria’s average score is 51.6 with latest observation in 2013 of 64.2, 
suggesting that the Bulgarian government’s role in the economy has decreased 
slightly. By contrast, Germany’s average score through 1995-2013 is 32.3 and in 
2013 – 37.7 (Figure 4).  
The next element, Regulatory Efficiency, rests on three types of freedom – 
Business, Labour and Monetary (please refer to Figures 5, 6, 7). A proxy for the 
State regulation of business is the Business Freedom Index. It is made up of ten 
equally weighted elements obtained from the Doing Business report by the World 
Bank. Namely, these are – starting a business (the number of procedures, cost, 
time and minimum capital requirements necessary to start a business), obtaining 
a license (measuring the number of procedures, the cost, time necessary to obtain 
a license), and closing a business (time, cost and recovery rates). Germany’s score 
on Business Freedom is high, but in the studied time period it increases by only 7 
0
20
40
60
80
100
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
S
co
re
 o
u
t 
o
f 
1
0
0
Fiscal Freedom Index
Bulgaria (upper graph)
Revisiting the ‘invisible hand’ hypothesis: a comparative study between Bulgaria and Germany  |  57 
 
 
Eastern Journal of European Studies | Volume 8(1) 2017 | ISSN: 2068-6633 | CC BY | www.ejes.uaic.ro 
 
basis points (from 85 in 1995 to 92 in 2013), while Bulgaria has marked a 
significant improvement of 18 basis points (from 55 in 1995 to 73 in 2013). 
 
 
Figure 4. Government Spending Index for Bulgaria and Germany (1995-2013) 
 
Source: Heritage Foundation 
 
Figure 5. Business Freedom Index for Bulgaria and Germany (1995-2013) 
 
Source: Heritage Foundation 
 
The second component of Regulatory Efficiency, the Labour Freedom, is 
an overall measure of the regulatory framework of the labour market that 
comprises six equally weighted elements - ratio of minimum wage to the average 
value added per worker, rigidity of hours, hindrance to hiring an additional 
employee, difficulty of firing a redundant worker, legally mandated notice period, 
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and mandatory severance pay. Data on these components is again extracted from 
the Doing business research of the World Bank. Data on Labour Freedom in 1995-
2004 is unavailable. However, data from 2005 to 2013 suggests that Bulgaria has 
an average score of 79.7, while Germany is lagging behind with an average of 
only 43.6. Results indicate that the Balkan country has twice as free labour market 
as the leader of the European Union. An underlying reason behind these scores is 
the fact that Bulgaria has a uniform minimal wage, while Germany has a minimal 
salary per sector, meaning larger government intervention. Furthermore, the 
labour market is highly unionized in Germany with larger labour taxes (Vasilev, 
2015a). Yet, one should emphasize that those come along with accredited and 
sometimes free of charge public services. 
 
Figure 6. Labour Freedom Index for Bulgaria and Germany (1995-2013) 
 
Source: Heritage Foundation 
 
The third element of Regulatory Efficiency, Monetary Freedom, is 
calculated with the use of factors like price stability and price controls. Ideally, a 
free market possesses price stability without intervention, since both price controls 
and high inflation creates noise in the market that disrupts economic dynamism. 
Germany remains constant at an average of 84.8 points throughout the observed 
period. Due to the hyperinflation in 1997 in Bulgaria, its average score is 20 
between 1995 and 2002, but more recent observations provide evidence for a 
tremendous advancement in Bulgaria with an average monetary freedom of 76.6 
basis points. This “catching-up” effect of Bulgaria’s series to the German ones is 
due to the adoption of the Currency Board in Bulgaria, fixing the currency to the 
German mark and consequently to the euro. Furthermore, the Bulgarian monetary 
policy closely follows the one conducted by the European Central Bank.  
And last, but not least, key elements in Open Markets are Trade Freedom, 
Investment Freedom and Financial Freedom (Figures 8, 9, 10). The first 
component is an indicator for the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers. The 
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trade freedom relies on the trade-weighted average tariff and a penalty is 
accumulated in case non-tariff barriers such as price, quantity, investment or 
customs restrictions as well as direct government intervention (e.g., with 
subsidiaries) exist. The Balkan country and Germany have a Trade Freedom 
average of 70 and 81, and a standard deviation of 14 and 4, respectively. 
Moreover, data shows that Bulgaria is converging towards Germany’s Trade 
Freedom levels since 2008, which is only natural because in 2007, Bulgaria 
entered the European Union Customs Union (EUCU), and since then both 
countries have been enjoying free mobility of goods, meaning zero tariffs on 
goods within the EUCU. 
 
Figure 7. Monetary Freedom Index for Bulgaria and Germany (1995-2013) 
 
Source: Heritage Foundation 
 
Figure 8. Trade Freedom Index for Bulgaria and Germany (1995-2013) 
 
Source: Heritage Foundation 
 
Furthermore, a country is economically free if no constraints on the flow of 
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to move without restrictions their resources internally as well as across borders. A 
score of one hundred on the Investment Freedom Index suggests the above 
mentioned criteria are satisfied. In this component, Bulgaria’s performance has 
deteriorated, falling from 70 in 1995 to 55 in 2013, whereas Germany has excelled 
with an increase from 70 in 1995 to 85 in 2013. 
 
Figure 9: Investment Freedom Index for Bulgaria and Germany (1995-2013) 
 
Source: Heritage Foundation 
 
And finally, Financial Freedom means banking efficiency with 
independence from government interference. State ownership of financial 
institutions hurts competition and the variety of services offered and such a 
country scores low on this index. In particular, Bulgaria’s and Germany’s average 
scores are the same - 56.8; yet, in 2013 the former scored 60, while the latter - 70. 
The average score indicates that, in both EU countries, there is a significant 
government interference with not fully independent central banks and both the 
Bulgarian and the German governments control a certain share of the financial 
intermediaries. As illustrated by data, a financial convergence between the two 
countries is present and it is only natural considering the integration within the 
Eurozone. 
All the categories – Rule of Law, Limited Government, Regulatory 
Efficiency and Open Markets – equally contribute to a country’s overall economic 
freedom measure. The above discussion of the components of the Freedom Index 
Indicators gives significant evidence in favour of placing Bulgaria among the 
moderately free economies with an Overall score of 65 and thus taking the 55th 
position worldwide. Meanwhile, Germany falls into the group of mostly free 
economies and occupies the 16th position with an Overall score of 72.8. 
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Figure 10. Financial Freedom Index for Bulgaria and Germany (1995-2013) 
 
Source: Heritage Foundation 
 
 
Figure 11. Overall Freedom Index for Bulgaria and Germany (1995-2013) 
 
Source: Heritage Foundation 
 
4. Dynamic correlation analysis 
 
The paper continues with a discussion of whether the listed economic 
freedom indicators are significant drivers of productivity and prosperity in 
Bulgaria, as a representative of transition economy with lower economic freedom, 
as well as in Germany, as an instance of a developed and mostly free economy. 
Growth accounting method provides the means to measure the Solow residual, 
also referred to as total factor productivity (table 1B in Appendix B).  
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4.1. Dynamic correlation between Bulgaria’s TFP and Germany’s TFP levels 
with the overall Freedom Index indicator  
 
The first step in this empirical part of the paper calculates the correlation 
coefficient between total factor productivity and the Overall Economic Freedom 
Indicator with 19 observations in the time span 1995-2013. The time series has 
been detrended with the use of Hodrick–Prescott time-series filter applied in the 
statistical package Stata. This approach will put emphasis on the generated 
correlation in the current period as well as on the most significant correlation with 
the use of maximum 9 lags (half the number of all observations). The highest 
correlation coefficient will point out the years needed for a change in the Freedom 
Index Indicator to have its thorough effect on the level of productivity. One would 
expect that a change, say in Government Spending Index, would not have an 
immediate impact on the current level of total factor productivity. Reasoning lies 
on the economic theory that a change in policy is followed by a slow response in 
economic levels, i.e. there is an adjustment process to the new implementations 
that could take up to several years. Additionally, if indeed freer societies are more 
prosperous, then one would rely on a positive and significant correlation between 
the Freedom Indexes and following periods of total factor productivity. 
Analysis on dynamical cross-correlations of the detrended time series 
suggests that Bulgaria’s contemporaneous correlation between TPF and The 
Overall Freedom Index scores the moderately low value of 0.16, whereas 
Germany’s correlation reaches the moderately high value of 0.38 (table 2B in 
Appendix B). Both correlation coefficients are positive and significant. An 
essential observation to be made is that the most significant correlation coefficient 
for Bulgaria is between 4th and 5th lag with values on average of 0.51. Meanwhile, 
Germany scores the highest in its contemporaneous effect with a diminishing rate 
in the lag structure.  
The output for Bulgaria suggests a unit change in the Overall Economic 
Freedom Index causes approximately 0.51 positive change in the level of 
productivity given enough adjustment time given (in this case in the range of 4-5 
years). This finding could be a signal that the changes in policies associated with 
the Freedom Indices initially create noise in the Bulgarian system, while the full 
potential of such a change on productivity levels reveals in the medium term. 
Hence, there will always be the uncertainty factor that drives societies such as 
Bulgaria to delay the economic change. As already discussed, this binds up the 
Invisible Hand of the market and impedes Schumpeter’s Creative Destruction in 
the short term.  
The most significant lag correlations for Germany are between the 1st and 
the 2nd lag with values on average of 0.28, however, contemporaneous correlation 
remains the highest (equal to 0.38), suggesting that Germany’s economy feels the 
thorough effect of a policy change more rapidly. This result is a proof that the 
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Western nation gives more freedom to the Creative Destruction process, thus 
achieving significant economic success in the short term.  
 
4.2. Correlation between the TFP gap of Germany and Bulgaria with the 
respective gap in their Freedom Index indicators  
 
The following step is to verify whether the gap in the productivity levels of 
Bulgaria and Germany are again significantly correlated with the respective gap 
in their Freedom Index Indicators. In such a case, this would be clear evidence in 
favour of the thesis that the difference in the level of productivity is due to the 
differences in the levels of freedom of the economy, i.e. that mostly free societies, 
such as the German one, owe their prosperity to the fast implementation of policies 
in the economic sector due to guidance by an Invisible Hand, while a moderately 
free society such as the Bulgarian one is lagging behind its target due to a slower 
response to innovations, resistance to change and thus a deviation from the 
assumptions that allow the Invisible Hand to work.    
The gap between the leader of the Euro-zone and the Balkan country is 
indeed correlated with the gap in their Freedom Indexes (table 2).  
The conducted analysis shows that a unit decrease in the Freedom from 
Corruption gap and Fiscal Freedom gap would lead to a significant decrease in 
the productivity gap by 0.77 and 0.74 units, respectively (i.e. a significant and 
positive correlation). A possible reason behind these coefficients is the fact that 
Germany scores high on both components and mostly remains constant while 
Bulgaria is at the bottom of the chart on the first criterion.  
 
Table 2. Dynamical Correlations between the gap in TFP levels between 
Germany and Bulgaria and their respective gap in the Freedom Index Indictors 
 
Gap correlation (Ge - Bg 
levels) 
Current 
Correlation 
1 Lag Most Significant 
Lag (MSL) 
Value of 
MSL 
A with Overall 0.294 0.112 1 0.112 
A with PropR 0.050 0.172 4 0.479 
A with FrCorr 0.771 0.642 1 0.642 
A with FiscFr 0.066 0.072 5 0.258 
A with GovtSp 0.242 0.375 2 0.377 
A with BusFr 0.374 0.303 4 0.341 
A with MonFr 0.058 0.017 1 0.017 
A with TradeFr -0.574 -0.567 7 0.165 
A with InvFr -0.368 -0.366 8 0.626 
A with FinFr 0.742 0.593 1 0.593 
Source: own estimations 
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What is more, this study has found moderate correlation coefficients 
between the TFP gap and the gap in Government Spending and Business Freedom. 
They have positive moderate contemporaneous correlation with values of 0.24 and 
0.37, respectively, strongly confirming the theory that less government 
intervention in the economy and the easiness of doing business are vital for 
economic prosperity.  
Additionally, the protection of Property Rights has a negligible effect on 
TFP in the current period; nonetheless, its significance emerges in the 4th lag with 
a high value of 0.48. A similar trend emerges with the gap in Fiscal Freedom – it 
has an insignificant contemporaneous correlation of 0.05 and a moderate 0.26 in 
the 5th lag. These two observations provide evidence in favour of the theory that 
the economy is sometimes slow when incorporating policy changes. The gap in 
Monetary Freedom, i.e. price stability, seems insignificant for the TFP gap in both 
current and lagged periods, which is counter-intuitive. However, both countries 
are under the control of The European Central Bank, implying that both countries 
follow the same monetary policy. Thus, the conducted analysis shows that the 
different productivity levels are not caused by the monetary component, in 
particular for the case of Bulgaria and Germany.  
Output indicates that a unit increase in gap of Trade Freedom and 
Investment Freedom would lead to a significant decrease in the productivity gap 
by 0.57 and 0.37 units, respectively (i.e. a significant and negative correlation). A 
possible reason behind these coefficients is the fact that both states score high on 
those components, on average for Bulgaria – 60 on Trade Freedom and 57 on 
Investment Freedom, while the mean for Germany is 82 on both Trade and 
Investment Freedom. Still, there is room for improvement in Bulgaria’s score in 
order to catch up with Germany. There has not been much volatility throughout 
the observed period (1995-2013), which might be a factor affecting the 
consistency of the generated results. Still, they are counter-intuitive and provide 
basis for future research. Due to the limitations in the Labor Freedom Index on 
both series, no correlation coefficient has been calculated (only 8 observations are 
present starting from 2005). 
On balance, the correlation between the gap in TFP and the Overall 
Economic Freedom Index Gap between Germany and Bulgaria is equal to the 
moderately high score of 0.29 (Figure 12). Six out of nine calculated correlations 
support the thesis that differences in prosperity between countries like Germany 
and Bulgaria rely heavily on the independence, reliability and effectiveness in 
their financial and business sphere, government sector, protection of property 
rights, fiscal and anti-corruption policies. Hence, the pursuit of market 
participants’ own interest guided as if guide by an Invisible Hand leads societies 
to a better performance. 
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Figure 12. Correlation between the TFP gap between Germany and Bulgaria 
and their respective gap in Overall Freedom Index for the period 1995-2013 
 
Source: own representation 
 
5. Bulgaria’s convergence to Germany 
 
In economic literature, convergence is defined as the hypothesis that poor 
countries grow at a faster rate than rich countries, and eventually catch up with 
them. The theory speculates that in the long term both poor and wealthy 
economies converge in terms of income per capita. Nonetheless, convergence as 
a hypothesis could be also interpreted as adopting best practices, a strong driver 
behind Total Factor Productivity. Di Liberto and Usai (2013) examine the TFP 
convergence across the European region. Even though the report of Di Liberto and 
Usai shows absence of TFP convergence among the EU15 (Bulgaria is not a 
member) in the time span of 1985-2006, the present study identifies a convex and 
monotone downtrend in the difference between Germany’s and Bulgaria’s Total 
Factor Productivity from 1995 until 2013 (Figure 13). The TFP gap was defined 
as the difference in levels between the Solow residuals of Germany and Bulgaria 
obtained from the economic equation of growth (equation 1 and Appendix A).  
This founding implies that Bulgaria is slowly but consistently catching up with 
the TFP levels of the leader of the European Union during the period 1995-2013. 
The monotone and decreasing relationship between the gap in Bulgaria’s 
and Germany’s TPF levels implies that they converge to distinct TFP levels but 
to the same steady state growth rates of TFP, suggesting the existence of a 
conditional medium-term convergence. This result is explained by taking saving 
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and population growth as exogenous (Mankiw, Romer and Weil,1992), and by 
taking into consideration the fact that a developing country, Bulgaria, replicates 
the production methods, technologies, and institutions of a developed country, 
Germany.  
 
Figure 13. Gap in Total Factor Productivity levels between Germany and 
Bulgaria shows a monotone and decreasing trend in the time span 1995-2013. 
 
Source: own representation 
 
Furthermore, the significant decline in the period 2004-2013 in the TFP gap 
depicted in Figure 13 is best motivated by the fact that in the mid-2000s, Bulgaria 
started to adopt the EU Chapters that represent the basis for accession to the 
European Union. They correspond to various reforms in administrative and 
institutional infrastructures as well as integration of Bulgaria’s national legislation 
to the legislation of the EU. In 2007, Bulgaria was accepted as a member of the 
European Union, thus becoming a part of a dynamic business environment, 
modern and socially friendly economy that thrives for high growth and 
employment. Economic integration between the Partner countries - Bulgaria and 
Germany, lies at the heart of free trade agreements, cooperation and the unifying 
structure of sectoral policies across all EU members.  
However, the observed 1995-2013 time period is short and could only serve 
as a signal for a potential initial long term convergence. Further research is needed 
following these lines once a more substantive and longer data sample is obtained to 
determine whether indeed a long term convergence pattern is present in the data 
series.  
 
6. Discussion and policy recommendations 
 
This paper also aims at providing policy recommendations aimed at 
decreasing the Germany-Bulgaria TFP gap even at a faster rate than the one 
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already observed. Data shows that Bulgaria is lagging behind Germany in its 
Property Rights, Freedom from Corruption and Investment Freedom Indexes, the 
most out of all ten Freedom Index Indexes. 
 
6.1. Guidelines for the Rule of Law component  
 
Two of the above mentioned Indexes are included in the Rule of Law, 
implying that Bulgaria is predominantly lagging behind its target country in this 
component. No degree of substantive law improvement would bring the Rule of 
Law to Bulgaria without an agile enforcement, and a sound judiciary as the core 
to enforcement (Dam, 2006). Each society needs institutions to resolve disputes 
and state structures to enforce property rights and contracts. If such mechanisms 
are not implemented, then transactions are limited to simple trades, bearing high 
risks, while productive investments are constrained. 
Data provided in this paper implies that during 1995-2013, the greatest 
Freedom Index gap between Bulgaria and Germany is Property Rights. On this 
Freedom Index, Germany has been steady at a high grade of 90 out 100, whereas 
it has been deteriorating in Bulgaria, increasing the gap even further in recent 
years. The Balkan country must consider placing this component in its list of top 
priorities that should undergo improvement. Roumeen Islam, a scholar at the 
World Bank, discusses in her 2003-paper “Institutional Reform and the Judiciary: 
Which Way Forward” that when judicial systems are strong, countries tend to 
have larger companies operating. Another observation made in the WB paper is 
that some states in Brazil with better judicial system tend to have more developed 
credit markets. Naturally, creditors avoid taking credit when unable to enforce 
repayment for their services. In Bulgaria, the court system is ill-functioning, and 
hence companies are forced to be involved in a “relationship business”, meaning 
that they are obliged to contract with those who have already established firm 
business relations. As already discussed, prosperous economies allow 
Schumpeter’s Creative Destruction process to take place, i.e. innovation, 
entrepreneurship and competition guide the market place. However, the political 
and economic environment in Bulgaria is constraining companies from 
undertaking potentially profitable opportunities. Furthermore, these limitations 
restrain the extent to which businesses are able to protect themselves from no 
longer profitable business relations. To conclude, the independence of the 
judiciary and the ability of individuals and business to enforce contacts is vital for 
achieving business integrity and hence, economic dynamism. 
It is essential to emphasize that public and private institutions influence the 
incentives and performance of agents in the judicial system (Islam, 2003). On the 
one hand, private institutions, as a part of an accountability mechanism, affect the 
reputation of judges and lawyers; hence their performance as well. On the other 
hand, the State has the authority to set rules for judges’ promotion for efficient 
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performance and penalties for underperformance. When applied swiftly, these can 
determine how court cases are conducted - access to them, their duration, meaning 
how long they stay in court and fairness associated with them. 
Additionally, external agencies, domestic or international non-
governmental organizations, media journalists, or policy institutes overseeing the 
judiciary also affect its performance in two broad directions. Firstly, they monitor 
and gather information on court processes and their outcomes, and secondly, they 
circulate the information, making it publicly available. The poor performance of 
the judiciary and the disregard of property rights suggest that such a feedback 
mechanism is ill-functioning in Bulgaria in the recent years. And public awareness 
needs to be addressed along these lines. Hence, a priority for Bulgaria’s prosperity 
is to implement changes in the current judicial system. Designing a judicial 
reform, however, is complicated due to the small amount of information and 
research made on developing economies. Interestingly, the “best practices” for a 
specific country are not always to follow the international laws (i.e., for Bulgaria 
to follow Germany’s Anti-Corruption policies), but rather to follow similar 
practices regarding institutions in neighbouring countries (Islam, 2003). And since 
the gap in the Freedom from Corruption Index is the next issue to be analysed, 
Bulgaria’s Northern neighbour – Romania, emerges as a bright example for Anti-
Corruption policies and enforcement.  
To begin with, Romania’s GDP growth is 3.8 (%, year-on-year), being the 
economy with the 5th largest growth rate in Europe as of October 2015. 
Furthermore, the European Commission 2016 Forecast Report on GDP growth for 
Romania is 3.3 (%, year-on-year), whereas Bulgaria’s is 1.3 (%, year-on-year). 
These estimations comprise a significant 2 (%, year-on-year) difference between 
the two neighbouring countries which entered the European Union concurrently 
in 2007. These data imply that Bulgaria is lagging behind a similar to its recent 
history post-communist country, and an underlying reason is the strength of the 
judiciary and the Anti-Corruption policies in place. For the last four years, 
Romania’s Supreme Court has: sentenced the former Prime Minister, Adrian 
Nastase, to two years of prison for involvement in a corruption scandal; arrested 
Bucharest’s mayor for allegations of taking bribes; and charged the former Prime 
Minister, Victor Ponta with accusations for fraud. These anti-corruption practices 
have a strong and positive effect on Romania’s economy, and furthermore, they 
earn praise from Romania’s Economic Partners for its efforts to combat 
corruption. From an economic point of view, unless Bulgaria follows similar to 
Romania’s solid Anti-Corruption practices, it will be exposed to insecure 
economic transactions that would continue to hamper economic dynamism.  
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6.2. Guidelines for the Investment Freedom Index 
 
The large gap in Investment Freedom between Germany and Bulgaria is the 
third and last component that the study will analyse. Moreover, it will provide 
Bulgaria with recommendations for improvement on this issue. As already 
defined, Investment Freedom measures the constraints associated with the flow of 
investment capital internally and across borders. Bulgaria has performed poorly 
on this criterion, with a decrease in its score from 70 in 1995, reaching 50 in 2011 
and finally stabilizing to 65 in 2015 (figure 9).  
What might be the reasons behind these fluctuations in the Bulgarian Index? 
The precise method of computing this particular Index is by subtracting points 
from the ideal score, meaning 100. A negative influence is measured by several 
factors such as the existence of national treatment of foreign investments, 
burdensome bureaucracy, restrictions on land ownership or sector investment, 
capital and foreign exchange controls. 
Bulgaria is a party to 63 bilateral agreements for mutual protection and 
stimulation of foreign investment. In addition to them, Bulgaria has signed the 
Encouragement of Investment Act (EIA) which provides for equal treatment of 
local and foreign investors in the Balkan country (KPMG, 2015). This Act 
regulates the encouragement of initial investments in both tangible and intangible 
long term assets, as well as the creation of new job opportunities, in compliance 
with regulations by the European Union. The EIA gives various stimulus 
privileges for both local and international investors who undertake large 
investment projects within the territory of Bulgaria. These measures are financed 
by the government and their goal is to improve the business environment. 
One would bring up the question why is then Bulgaria lagging behind in 
Investment Freedom if the country is involved in Acts and bilateral agreements 
whose function is to safeguard the free flow of investment capital. The due 
diligence with which these contracts are implemented might be the underlying 
reason for the bad performance of Bulgaria in Investment Freedom. Recent 
government decisions caused damage, either indirectly or directly, on the Index. 
Firstly, Bulgaria’s poor performance might be due to the burdensome 
bureaucracy that both foreign and local investors are confronted with. According 
to the Doing Business Report by the World Bank (2016), in order to start a 
business in Bulgaria, you need to go through at least 4 procedures and 18 working 
days, whereas for obtaining a construction permit the number of procedures 
increases to 16 and the number of days jumps to 110. This delay increases 
immensely investment costs, causing return on investment to drop and hence Total 
Factor Productivity rises with lingering rates.    
Secondly, in 2014, the Bulgarian National Assembly approved a five-year 
residency requirement for the purchase of agricultural land by non-EU foreign 
investors, which certainly had a negative effect on the Investment Freedom score. 
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A Parliament amendment of the law in 2012 (stating that a strategic infrastructure 
project could receive a preferential expropriation regime) damaged private 
property laws, and decreased even further the investment incentives of foreigners. 
In 2013, after a Constitutional Court decision on a land owner plaintiff, the State 
limited the prior preferential treatment strategy for key infrastructure projects. 
Currently, three major motorways are under construction with forecasts to be 
completed in 2020 – Struma (part of Pan-European Corridor IV), Hemus 
(connecting the capital city with Varna), and Black Sea (connecting numerous 
coastal cities). Such infrastructure projects will certainly improve the efficiency 
with which goods, services and people are transported. Nevertheless, in order to 
improve investment incentives in Bulgaria, the expropriation of these lands needs 
to be done in a prudent manner with fair compensation of the private property 
owners.  
Last but not least, as already largely discussed in the beginning of this 
section, corruption is a vicious disease that infects various sectors of the economy. 
Due to weak judiciary performing poor enforcement of the law and to the lack of 
concrete Anti-Corruption practices, corruption might be present in starting up a 
business, obtaining a license, negotiating private property owners’ compensation 
or simply in the execution of EU funded projects. From an economic perspective, 
corruption could be regarded as an additional tax burden on capital and investment 
as a whole. Consequently, investment incentives are decreased leading to a 
sluggish economy.   
We also admit to some limitations of the current research: for example, the 
analysis is only based on a correlation analysis, which does not necessarily prove 
the impact of labour market mechanisms on productivity. In addition, growth 
models also include other factors as well, like human capital; the capacity of the 
HF Freedom Index to reveal the market freedom might also have some 
shortcomings. 
 
Summary and conclusions 
 
This paper transforms Adam Smith’s theory about an invisible force that 
drives free societies to prosperity into an updated modern understanding of the 
drivers of economic success. If vital conditions, such as low degree of government 
intervention, lack of informational asymmetries, uniformity of market participants 
and efficient Rule of Law are present, then the Invisible Hand of the market makes 
limited resources meet their best ends, hence promoting economic excellence. 
Nevertheless, free markets and mixed market economies often suffer from the 
above listed economic features which hamper economic dynamism. Two of the 
main debunkers of the Invisible Hand theory, Joseph Stiglitz and George Akerlof, 
suggest that information asymmetries, in particular, cause inefficient allocation of 
the labour force and give rise to transaction costs. Yet societies that are exposed 
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to both of these factors have learnt how to mitigate their adverse impact on the 
markets. Namely, they let Schumpeter’s Creative Destruction process take over 
the market (it accounts for the industrial change of revolutionizing the economic 
structure by destroying the old and creating a new one). Or equivalently, the 
government should help improve an economic downturn not by a direct 
intervention that creates insecurity and confusion, but indirectly by providing a 
legal and political framework that supports private sector activities and 
competition. A useful way to assess the state-provided legal and political 
framework is the Economic Freedom Index, which is divided into four extensive 
types: Rule of Law (Property Rights and Freedom from Corruption), Limited 
Government (Fiscal Freedom and Government Spending), Regulatory Efficiency 
(Business, Monetary, Labour Freedom), and Open Markets (Trade, Investment, 
Financial Freedom).  
The correlation analysis between Total Factor Productivity (as a measure 
of economic well-being) and the Freedom Index Indicators of Germany and 
Bulgaria is conducted for the period 1995-2013. With small exceptions, all 
correlations seem to be moderate and positive. For instance, Bulgaria’s 
contemporaneous correlation between TFP and the Overall Economic Freedom 
Index is a moderate value of 0.16, with the highest significance of 0.52 in the 4th 
lag. By contrast, Germany’s correlation between the same factors has a more 
significant value of 0.38, followed by a diminishing correlation in the lag 
structure. Hence, one might conclude that a transition economy such as the 
Bulgarian one responds fully to policy changes within the following 4 years, 
whereas a mostly free economy, such as the German one, incorporates policies 
rapidly. Moreover, the gap in the productivity levels of both countries is also 
moderately correlated with the gap in their Overall Freedom Indices with a 
satisfactory value of 0.29. Thus, the output provides evidence in favour of the 
thesis that the difference in the level of productivity is due to the differences in 
the levels of freedom of the economy, i.e. Germany owes its prosperity to the rapid 
implementation of policies reliant on the principles of economic freedom, while 
Bulgaria is lagging behind its target country due to a slower response to 
innovations and a lower reliance on freedom in the economy.   
Another essential finding of this paper is the monotone and diminishing 
relationship between Germany and Bulgaria’s TFP levels in the time span 1995-
2013, suggesting the existence of a “catching up effect”. To extend Bulgaria’s 
medium-term convergence towards Germany’s TFP levels on the long term, the 
Balkan country needs to implement essential policy improvements in its 
investment incentives and Rule of Law.  
To conclude, the comparative study between Germany and Bulgaria is a 
vivid proof that the Invisible Hand of the Market is relevant even today. Almost 
240 years after Adam Smith first considered that societies, not hampered by 
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excessive regulation, tend to perform better, the Invisible Hand of the Market still 
guides them to prosperity. 
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Appendix A 
 
Growth Accounting Approach (as derived in “Measuring Total Factor 
Productivity: Growth Accounting for Bulgaria” by Ganev (in 2005) 
To measure Yt we use the gross domestic product in constant prices, and for 
Lt – labour force 16-65 years, obtained from World Development Indicators 
(WDI) Database for both Bulgaria and Germany. However, data on the variable 
Kt is not published and can be obtained by the Permanent Inventory Method. There 
is a recursive relation between the individual components of the capital time 
series.  
𝐾𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿). 𝐾𝑡−1 ,  (1) 
In the above equation, It represents total investment and δ is the depreciation 
rate. The total investment variable in PPP USD is extracted from International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) Database. Furthermore, the calculation of equation (1) is a 
bit challenging due to the unknown level of the initial capital.  
The method used for the calculation of the initial capital is dependent on 
the depreciation rate of capital. In this case, the δ equals 0.05 for Bulgaria (Ganev 
2005) and 0.082 for Germany (Vasilev 2015a). The first coefficient can be 
interpreted as the fact that full depreciation of capital occurs in 20 years in 
Bulgaria, whereas in Germany it takes only 12 years.  
Initial capital is calculated by formula (2) by setting the initial capital equal 
to the ratio of initial investment and the depreciation rate: 
𝐾0 =
𝐼0
𝛿
 ,  (2) 
The conducted analysis is heavily dependent on the delta that we are using 
for the generation of initial capital. Nevertheless, this effect decreases 
significantly in time. The further back in time the initial capital is, the smaller the 
influence that its levels have on the obtained results. The already mentioned 
Permanent Inventory Method represents a recursive substitution back in time. For 
instance, the formula for the period (t-1) is: 
𝐾𝑡−1 = 𝐼𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝛿). 𝐾𝑡−2 ,  (3) 
Equation (3) can be substituted back into equation (1) and the result looks 
like: 
𝐾𝑡 = ∑ (1 − 𝛿)
𝑖. 𝐼𝑡−𝑖 + (1 − 𝛿)
𝑛. 𝐾𝑡−𝑛
𝑛−1
𝑖=0  ,   (4) 
This relation could be continually applied to an arbitrary moment in time. 
This is the so-called method of geometric decline in capital. However, this method 
does not best meet our assumptions about the nature of capital. We need capital 
to have finite life and to amortize for a finite amount of time. Yet, calculation 
based on formula (4) with n→∞ would never converge to zero, assuming capital 
has infinite life. On those grounds, a modified version of formula (4) to calculate 
the capital series is used: 
𝐾𝑡 = ∑ (1 − 𝑖. 𝛿). 𝐼𝑡−𝑖 + (1 − 𝑛. 𝛿). 𝐾𝑡−𝑛
𝑛−1
𝑖=0  ,  (5) 
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In this paper, the preferred model for capital generation is the linear method. 
It assumes a uniform decline of the initial capital. Moreover, the advantage of this 
model is that a unit of capital is fully amortized for 1/ δ number of periods. The 
generated results for Bulgaria and Germany in the period 1995-2013 are as 
follows: 
 
 Bulgaria’s capital Germany’s capital 
1995 124 128 525 081 12 903 321 577 517 
1996 233 973 187 489 23 575 508 596 145 
1997 443 807 139 456 43 020 309 248 486 
1998 842 627 989 823 78 397 963 631 779 
1999 1 596 546 134 740 142 713 467 095 092 
2000 3 024 826 246 510 259 659 016 317 899 
2001 5 730 531 843 410 472 191 773 790 463 
2002 10 854 805 713 447 858 504 353 064 718 
2003 20 561 198 267 706 1 560 788 845 488 420 
2004 38 946 045 326 271 2 837 373 441 641 450 
2005 73 769 377 427 557 5 157 882 837 242 330 
2006 139 727 783 773 461 9 376 008 146 181 050 
2007 264 657 454 305 092 17 043 428 339 475 400 
2008 501 284 615 611 210 30 980 669 315 124 100 
2009 949 469 463 121 593 56 314 609 454 191 600 
2010 1 798 367 010 318 220 102 364 870 955 834 000 
2011 3 406 245 472 025 810 186 071 465 937 432 000 
2012 6 451 690 619 530 030 338 226 697 939 466 000 
2013 12 219 996 036 381 000 614 802 609 946 305 000 
Source: own computation 
 
Appendix B 
 
Table 1B 
Year Bulgaria’s total factor 
productivity (in levels) 
Germany’s total factor 
productivity (in levels) 
1995 66.7425 1603.2074 
1996 52.1928 1351.4600 
1997 39.6224 1150.6945 
1998 31.4715 980.8526 
1999 22.8329 843.0880 
2000 18.6347 730.4991 
2001 14.5188 622.5835 
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2002 11.6891 523.6953 
2003 9.4624 438.7196 
2004 7.6019 370.2106 
2005 6.1861 310.7001 
2006 4.9052 269.3596 
2007 3.9652 232.8945 
2008 3.1533 197.6323 
2009 2.3050 156.7001 
2010 1.7901 137.1397 
2011 1.4045 118.4588 
2012 1.0717 101.2197 
2013 0.8253 84.8819 
Source: own computation 
 
 
 
Source: own representation 
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Table 2B 
Correlation between Overall Freedom Index and TFP levels 
Time period Bulgaria Germany 
Current 0.160 0.378 
First Lag 0.288 0.286 
Second Lag 0.388 0.281 
Third Lag 0.421 0.203 
Fourth Lag 0.518 0.190 
Fifth Lag 0.502 0.199 
Sixth Lag 0.467 0.143 
Seventh Lag 0.436 0.026 
Eight Lag 0.276 -0.128 
Source: own computation 
 
 
